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Signaling through Dynamic Thresholds in
Financial Covenants
Among private loan contracts with covenants originated during 1996-2012, 35% have ¯nancial
covenant thresholds that automatically increase according to a predetermined schedule. Firms
that accept these dynamic thresholds receive a lower interest spread and improve their cred-
itworthiness relative to matched control ¯rms. However, in the event of a covenant violation,
these ¯rms are less likely to receive a waiver, more likely to pay higher waiver fees, experience
greater investment cuts, and are more likely to switch lead lenders than control ¯rms. Overall,
our ¯ndings suggest that signaling through dynamic thresholds in covenants is credible but
costly to borrowers.
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I. Introduction
The literature on debt ¯nancing suggests that borrowers may be able to reduce the costs
of asymmetric information by revealing their private information through contract terms.1
Financial covenants are a typical example of such contract terms, which contain informa-
tion about borrowers' types. Since ¯nancial covenants serve as \tripwires" that limit agency
problems and allocate control rights to creditors upon default, covenant thresholds negotiated
between borrowers and lenders likely re°ect ¯rm's private information about its expected
creditworthiness.
Covenants may have constant thresholds that remain at the same level throughout the
duration of the loan, or they may have dynamic thresholds that automatically change to
prespeci¯ed levels according to a predetermined schedule. For instance, the minimum al-
lowed ¯xed charge coverage ratio for a borrower at loan initiation could be 1.65. A dynamic
covenant threshold feature would automatically raise the covenant threshold to 1.75 after
one year (as illustrated in Appendix A). Crucially, dynamic covenant thresholds are preva-
lent in loan contracts; 35% of the private loan contracts with covenants originated during
1996{2012 incorporate ¯nancial covenant thresholds that automatically increase according to
a predetermined schedule.
Prior literature suggests that high-quality borrowers signal to di®erentiate themselves
through their loan contract terms (e.g., Zimmerman 1975; Aghion and Bolton 1992; Dewa-
tripont and Tirole 1994; Garleanu and Zwiebel 2009). But, there is relatively limited evidence
for signaling using dynamic covenant thresholds or evidence that indicates whether this sig-
naling is credible. In addition, a large literature documents that creditors exercise control
rights after covenant violations and that creditors in°uence ¯rms' investment, ¯nancing, and
operating decisions (e.g., Chava and Roberts 2008; Nini, Su¯, and Smith 2008, 2012; Roberts
and Su¯ 2009; Ozelge and Saunders 2012; Saunders and Song 2014). Again, there is very
limited evidence on how creditors' ex post decisions after covenant violations are related to
1For example, Stiglitz and Weiss 1981, 1983; Chan and Kanats 1985; Demiroglu and James 2010; Manso,
Strulovici, and Tchistyi 2010.
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the ex ante information revealed at loan initiation. We address these gaps in the literature by
investigating the economic consequences for borrowers that accept ¯nancial covenants with
dynamic thresholds, both at the origination of the loan and{more importantly{if they fail to
deliver the performance they signaled.
In general, borrowers have incentives to signal positive information to di®erentiate them-
selves from others. Signaling through ¯nancial covenant thresholds may increase the credibility
of signaling, since violating covenants will transfer control rights to the creditors. However,
this may not necessarily imply that all signaling through covenants is equally credible. Sig-
naling through dynamic covenant thresholds may be subject to higher uncertainty, since the
incentives underlying such signaling are likely to di®er from the incentives underlying signal-
ing through constant covenant thresholds. If a ¯rm accepts ¯nancial covenants with constant
thresholds, it implies that the ¯rm has fewer risk-shifting opportunities (e.g., Demiroglu and
James 2010) and is expected to maintain at least its current ¯nancial condition. In contrast,
if a ¯rm accepts ¯nancial covenants with dynamic thresholds, this implies that the ¯rm will
take on investment projects that could generate additional positive cash °ows and improve its
creditworthiness. Since expected future creditworthiness is based on managers' projections,
managers may have incentives to in°ate future prospects or to be overly optimistic if the
expected costs of failure to deliver the expected performance are not high. For example, since
renegotiations are common in private lending (Denis and Wang 2014; Roberts 2015), managers
may rely on renegotiations with lenders to relax covenants after loan originations or to request
a waiver for covenant violations (e.g., Chava, Wang, and Zou 2017). Alternatively, managers
may expect lenders to delay terminating projects or delay liquidating assets after covenant
violations, due to sunk costs and information asymmetry (i.e., dynamic adverse selection, see
Bolton and Dewatripont 2005).
For signaling through ¯nancial covenants with dynamic thresholds to be e®ective in mit-
igating the problems associated with information asymmetry, we expect two important con-
ditions to hold: (1) borrowers receive some bene¯ts if they signal an improvement in future
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creditworthiness, and (2) the economic consequences of covenant violations are likely to be
more severe than if they had not signaled. The ¯rst condition is necessary, since a borrower
is unlikely to agree to covenants with increasing requirements if there are no bene¯ts, holding
everything else equal. The second condition is pertinent to prevent dynamic adverse selection
and to maintain the credibility of the signal. If failure to improve the creditworthiness as
signaled does not lead to severe consequences, opportunistic borrowers are likely to mimic
others with good prospects and send a false signal about future prospects.2 In this paper, we
document the incidence of signaling through dynamic covenant thresholds, and we document
both the bene¯ts of signaling at loan initiation and the ex post signaling costs when ¯rms
violate covenants.
We collect all the loan contracts for public ¯rms in the Dealscan database from 1996 to
2012, and we supplement these data with the SEC ¯lings data. For covenant violation data,
we start with the sample from Roberts and Su¯ (2009) and extend it to 2015 using a similar
text search algorithm. The appendices provide details of the construction of the dynamic
covenant thresholds and the text search algorithm. In addition, we retrieve the information
on covenant violation waivers and waiver fees from these ¯lings. When compared to ¯rms
that accept covenants with constant thresholds, we ¯nd that, on average, ¯rms that accept
dynamic thresholds have a higher default risk, lower pro¯tability, and raise more funds from
loans. Loans that include ¯nancial covenants with dynamic thresholds also have higher interest
spreads and longer maturity.
The descriptive evidence indicates that ¯rms that take loans with and without dynamic
covenant thresholds are not directly comparable. Firms with high creditworthiness, or those
with few investment opportunities, may ¯nd it unnecessary to signal or ¯nd it impossible to
signal an improvement in creditworthiness. The net bene¯ts of signaling through dynamic
2Notably, we do not suggest that creditors necessarily pre-commit to a harsher treatment of borrowers that
have signaled. Covenant violations raise red °ags about the credibility of information that managers revealed
at loan initiation and the quality of the ¯rm's projects. These more severe consequences could re°ect that
creditors quickly update their evaluation on ¯rm risk and act conservatively on the information implied by
covenant violations.
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covenant thresholds for these ¯rms are likely to be limited or even negative. Therefore, we
control for observable di®erences between ¯rms with and without dynamic covenant thresholds
using a propensity score matched sample and conduct all our empirical tests on this sample.3
In our initial tests, we examine the consequences of signaling using dynamic covenant
thresholds at loan origination. We ¯nd that, compared to the matched control group of
borrowers which accept constant covenant thresholds, borrowers who accept covenants with
dynamic thresholds receive loan spreads that are approximately 16 basis points lower. Con-
sistent with this evidence, the equity market reaction to the announcements of loans with
dynamic covenant thresholds is more positive: the 5-day abnormal stock return is approxi-
mately 1.02% higher relative to that for the matched loans with constant covenant thresholds.
We next examine the ex post performance of ¯rms that accept dynamic covenant thresholds
in their loan contracts. Overall, ¯rms that accept ¯nancial covenants with dynamic thresholds
exhibit a reduction in credit risk within four, eight and twelve quarters after loan origination.
However, ¯rms accepting dynamic covenant thresholds are also more likely to violate loan
covenants than their matched control group with constant covenant thresholds. This result
suggests that (a) some of the ¯rms that accept dynamic covenant thresholds may be overly
optimistic about their future prospects, or (b) some of these ¯rms may deliberately overstate
their future prospects to receive the bene¯ts of signaling with dynamic covenant thresholds
at loan origination.
Control rights are transferred to lenders after technical covenant violations, and lenders
may use the threat of accelerating the loan to extract concessions from the borrower and
in°uence the borrower's investment and ¯nancial policies (e.g., Chava and Roberts 2008).
At minimum, the bargaining power of the lender relative to the borrower increases after
3For ¯rm-loan observations that include ¯nancial covenants with dynamic thresholds (the treatment group),
we identify a matched group with similar ¯rm and loan characteristics, but accepting only ¯nancial covenants
with constant thresholds (the control group) using a propensity matching approach. After matching, ¯rms
accepting covenants with dynamic thresholds are not signi¯cantly di®erent from those in the control group.
Loans that include ¯nancial covenants with dynamic thresholds have more covenants than loans in the con-
trol group and are insigni¯cant in other terms. The sample for our empirical tests only includes ¯rm-loan
observations with similar characteristics but di®ering in covenant features.
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technical covenant violations. To examine how signaling relates to consequences of covenant
violations, we focus on lenders' decisions on granting a waiver, changes in ¯rm investment
around violations, and the impact on lending relations for future ¯nancing.
Granting a waiver implies that creditors are not likely to intervene signi¯cantly in borrow-
ers' operating and investment decisions at the moment of violation. We ¯nd that, controlling
for ¯rm performance at the time of covenant violations, ¯rms that accept ¯nancial covenants
with dynamic thresholds are less likely to receive a waiver. The probability of receiving a
waiver on covenant violation is 10.7 percentage points lower. Further, waiver fees are also
part of the monetary costs of covenant violations and we manually collect this information
from SEC ¯lings. The average waiver fee for our sample is $731,278, and the median fee is
$150,000. The average waiver fee as a fraction of the deal amount is 53 basis points, and
the median fee is 20 basis points. We ¯nd that, conditional on receiving a waiver, borrowers
violating ¯nancial covenants with dynamic thresholds are more likely to pay a waiver fee than
the matched control ¯rms, and the probability of paying a waiver fee is 4.7 percentage points
higher (evaluated at the mean). The former, on average, also pays higher fees relative to the
deal amount. The results on waiver fees suggest that renegotiation costs are higher for ¯rms
violating ¯nancial covenants with dynamic thresholds, even if they receive a waiver.
Creditor intervention over ¯rm investment is also costly to borrowers. We compare the con-
sequences of covenant violation on ¯rm investment. Borrowers that accept ¯nancial covenants
with dynamic thresholds also exhibit a greater investment cut after covenant violations, by
0.25 percentage points, on average, and by 0.49 percentage points if they do not receive a
waiver, relative to matched control ¯rms. This suggests that creditors may be particularly
concerned about the quality of ¯rm investment projects if creditworthiness has not improved
as expected. Their monitoring incentives are stronger if they decide not to grant a waiver to
the borrower.
Finally, we examine whether violating ¯nancial covenants with dynamic thresholds a®ects
the lending relationship. For those taking new loans after covenant violations, ¯rms that
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accept ¯nancial covenants with dynamic thresholds in the previous loan are more likely to
switch lead lenders: the probability of switching lead lenders is 10.6 percentage points higher.
On average, they face a greater increase in interest spreads by 28 basis points for the new
loan taken after the covenant violation, compared to matched control ¯rms. If ¯rms accepting
¯nancial covenants with dynamic thresholds switch lenders, they face an additional increase
of 62 basis points in interest spreads for the next new loan taken. Overall, the evidence
suggests that borrowers with dynamic covenant thresholds ¯nd it more costly to maintain the
existing lending relationship if they fail to deliver the performance they had signaled at loan
origination.
The results on the consequences of violating covenants indicate signi¯cant costs of signaling
with dynamic covenant thresholds. These results may also be interpreted to mean that the
signaling costs of dynamic covenant thresholds include (a) the incremental waiver fees that
violating ¯rms with dynamic covenant thresholds pay, (b) the additional investment cut after
the covenant violations (c) the incremental interest spread increases for the loans taken after
the covenant violations, and, (d) the higher probability of losing the lending relationship after
the covenant violations that is also costly for borrowers.4 These ex post costs trade o® with
the bene¯ts of signaling with dynamic covenant thresholds at loan origination and may be
su±cient to make the signal credible.
Our study is closely related to Demiroglu and James (2010), who study the information
conveyed through the selection of tight ¯nancial covenants. However, in their paper, ¯rms
signal through tight covenants at loan origination, in contrast to signaling with dynamic
covenant thresholds in our paper. Therefore, the type of ¯rms in their sample and the incen-
tives to signal that they consider are di®erent from those in our paper. Demiroglu and James
(2010) suggest that accepting initial covenant tightness implies that these ¯rms have fewer
risk-shifting investment opportunities. They report a decrease in investment spending after
loan origination, and they experience a lower investment cut if they violate covenants. In
4We thank an anonymous referee for encouraging us to pursue this avenue.
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contrast, we ¯nd that ¯rms accepting ¯nancial covenants with dynamic thresholds appear to
have greater investment opportunities. These ¯rms show an increase in investment following
loan origination and are more likely to have a capital expenditure covenant that relaxes re-
strictions on investment over time. In addition, the initial covenant slack tends to be greater
for earnings-based covenants with dynamic thresholds at loan initiation (Li et al. 2016). So,
the di®erences in regard to the nature of ¯rms and their incentives explain the di®erences in
the consequences of covenant violations documented in our paper and those documented in
Demiroglu and James (2010).
The focus of our study also di®ers from the few prior studies on the determinants of ad-
justments in covenant requirements. Dichev and Skinner (2002) brie°y mention the changing
covenant requirements in their study of covenant slack, but they do not further explore them.
Beatty, Weber, and Yu (2008) investigate state-contingent adjustments for net worth covenants
(i.e., the buildup feature). The buildup feature is fundamentally di®erent from the dynamic
covenant thresholds feature. The former re°ects lenders' conservatism in monitoring by au-
tomatically increasing the covenant threshold for net worth when earnings are positive, while
the latter re°ects ¯rms' private information at loan initiation. A contemporaneous paper by
Li et al. (2016) studies earnings-based covenants with increasing thresholds and the trade-o®
between initial covenant slack and increasing covenant thresholds. They assume that lenders
will have stronger control rights ex post, but they do not provide any evidence on actual
creditors' impact on borrowers that fail to deliver the performance as signaled. We expand
the scope of their study by incorporating other ¯nancial covenants, and we focus extensively
on how dynamic covenant thresholds are related to the consequences of covenant violations.
Our study also ¯lls a void in the literature by (a) examining the credibility of signaling, (b)
how the consequences of covenant violations are associated with signaling at loan initiation,
and (c) how signaling a®ects lending relationships.5 Our results show that signaling through
5Signaling future creditworthiness through covenants is also di®erent from signaling creditworthiness
through performance pricing provisions, which will not shift control rights to creditors if the signal is not
credible.
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dynamic covenant thresholds is credible but costly to borrowers, since creditors react more
negatively if a borrower fails to deliver the expected performance.
An early study by Beneish and Press (1993) documents some preliminary evidence on
waivers using a small and hand-collected sample. But, to our knowledge, we are the ¯rst to
use a large sample to document empirical evidence on lenders' decisions on waivers of covenant
violations and analyze the waiver fees charged by lenders. Decisions on waivers are one of the
outcomes of creditor-borrower negotiations, and they play an important role in determining
how creditor control a®ects ¯rm behavior through contracting. It is largely unknown what
factors are associated with lenders' decisions on granting a waiver and how covenant waivers
are related to the impact on ¯rm investment after covenant violations. We examine whether
creditors' decisions regarding waivers are associated with the information revealed at loan
initiation and investment cuts after covenant violations, controlling for waiver decisions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the sample
and present descriptive evidence. We present our empirical evidence in Section 3 and Section
4. Section 5 includes discussions on additional evidence and robustness checks. We conclude
the paper in Section 6.
II. Data, Sample Construction, and Descriptive Statistics
We obtain data on loan contracts for public ¯rms from the LPC Dealscan database. Since
covenants are designed at the loan package level, and each package may have multiple loan
facilities, we use the maximum value of each contract term (e.g., maturity, indicator variable
for secured loan, interest spread) across all facilities within a package.6 The sample of loan
contracts starts in 1996 because electronic SEC ¯lings are available from 1996 onward, and
the sample ends in 2012 because we require at least three years of ¯nancial data after loan
origination to observe borrowers' post-¯nancing performance.
We then retrieve the credit agreements for the loan packages in our sample from 10-K, 10-
6Our results are robust if we use loan terms corresponding to the loan facility that has the longest maturity.
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Q, and 8-K SEC ¯lings, and we identify the amended loan contracts in the Dealscan database
following Nikolaev (2016). For covenant violation data, we start with the SEC links for
reported covenant violations provided on Michael Roberts' website and ¯rm-quarter violation
data provided by Amir Su¯. Since their data end in 2012, we extend the sample to 2015 using
a text search algorithm similar to the one introduced in Roberts and Su¯ (2009). We also
collect information on covenant violation waivers from ¯rms' SEC ¯lings. The details of our
text search algorithm are described in Appendix B. Our methodology for identifying covenant
violations and waivers is similar to that of Roberts and Su¯ (2009).
Following Drucker and Puri (2009), we keep only those loan contracts that have at least
one covenant, and we ensure that the sample only includes contracts with complete loan in-
formation. In most loan agreements, covenant thresholds are contractually set to increase
nominal requirements over time. We exclude agreements that include covenants with decreas-
ing nominal requirements, since they are very rare and are primarily used for ¯rms under
special circumstances. We also exclude ¯nancial ¯rms (SIC codes 6000-6999) from our sam-
ple. The ¯nancial data and equity market information are from the COMPUSTAT/CRSP
database.
We keep observations that feature all the information available on the following ¯rm and
loan characteristics: distance to default, book assets, Tobin's Q, return on assets (ROA),
leverage, capital expenditure (Capex), loan amount to tangible assets, loan maturity, number
of covenants, and loan spreads. The ¯nal sample contains 8,729 loan packages for 3,328 unique
¯rms for the 1996-2012 period. Out of these 8,729 loan packages, 3,007 include covenants with
dynamic thresholds.
Panel A of Table 1 reports the types of ¯nancial covenants used in our sample contracts
and shows how frequently these covenants have dynamic thresholds. There are 16 types of
¯nancial covenants. For each ¯nancial covenant, we report (a) the number of loan packages
that include the covenant, (b) the number of loan packages that include the covenant with
dynamic thresholds, and (c) the percentage of loan packages that include the covenant with
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dynamic thresholds. The dynamic thresholds are most commonly imposed on covenants that
monitor borrowers' ability to generate cash for debt payments (e.g., covenants on EBITDA,
Debt to EBITDA, Interest Coverage).
Panel B of Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on covenant thresholds for each individual
covenant between covenants with dynamic thresholds and those with constant thresholds.
As shown in Columns (1) and (2), for covenants that require borrowers to maintain the
¯nancial ratio above the minimum threshold (e.g., cash interest coverage or current ratio),
the nominal initial thresholds for covenants with dynamic thresholds are consistently lower
than those for the corresponding covenants with constant thresholds. For covenants that
require borrowers to maintain the ¯nancial ratio below the maximum thresholds allowed (e.g.,
leverage ratio or Debt-to-EBITDA), the nominal initial thresholds for covenants with dynamic
thresholds are consistently higher than those for the corresponding covenants with constant
thresholds. These patterns are not likely to be driven by di®erences in the de¯nitions of
covenant variables because of the consistency in how the nominal thresholds for covenants with
dynamic thresholds di®er from the nominal thresholds for covenants with constant thresholds.
These descriptive statistics show that ¯rms that accept dynamic covenant thresholds are
signi¯cantly di®erent from those that accept constant covenant thresholds in terms of both
¯rm and loan characteristics.
Columns (3) and (4) report the mean percentage increase and the median percentage in-
crease, respectively, in the nominal requirements for covenants with dynamic thresholds. The
percentage increase in nominal requirements is calculated as (¯nal ratio-initial ratio)/initial
ratio. For the covenants that require borrowers to maintain a ¯nancial ratio below the maxi-
mum threshold allowed, the more negative the percentage change, the greater the increase in
nominal requirements, since the ¯nal thresholds of these covenants are lower than the initial
thresholds. For simplicity, we multiply the percentage change by -1 in these cases, so that the
increase in requirements is represented by a positive number. On average, all covenants with
dynamic thresholds show a material increase in requirements that ranges from 12% to 262%,
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depending on the type of ¯nancial covenant.
In untabulated results, we ¯nd that ¯nancial covenants with dynamic thresholds are often
included for ¯nancing purposes that may signi¯cantly change borrowers' credit risk and/or
increase agency con°icts between shareholders and creditors. Among loan packages with
dynamic covenant thresholds, the top three ¯nancing purposes are recapitalization (72%),
exit takeovers (59%), and leveraged buyouts (54%).
III. Signaling through Dynamic Covenant Thresholds
In this section, we ¯rst empirically examine ¯rm and loan characteristics associated with
the presence of dynamic thresholds in ¯nancial covenants and then describe our matching
method for identifying comparable control groups. Next, we analyze the impact of including
dynamic covenant thresholds on the interest spreads of the loan and whether dynamic covenant
thresholds relate to the loan announcement returns for these ¯rms. Finally, we consider the
ex post performance of ¯rms with dynamic covenant thresholds.
A. Firm and Loan Characteristics Associated with the Presence of Dynamic Thresholds in
Financial Covenants
In this subsection, we empirically examine the ¯rm and loan characteristics associated
with the presence of dynamic thresholds in ¯nancial covenants using the following model:
Trendit =°0 + °1 ¤Distance to Defaulti;t¡1 + °2 ¤ Capexi;t¡1 + °3 ¤ Tobin's Qi;t¡1
+ °4 ¤ Log(Assets)i;t¡1 + °5 ¤ ROAi;t¡1 + °6 ¤ Leveragei;t¡1
+ °7 ¤ Loan/PPEi;t¡1 + °8 ¤ Spreadi;t + °9 ¤ Log(Maturity)i;t
+ °10 ¤ Log(Total Covenants)i;t + °11 ¤ Securedi;t + °12 ¤ Amendi;t
+ ´industry + ºyear¡quarter + "i;t;
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where subscript i denotes loan package i, and subscript t denotes year-quarter t. For the de-
pendent variable, Trend, we construct four alternative measures to capture the use of dynamic
threshold covenants in loan contracts. The ¯rst measure, Trend Dummy, is equal to 1 if a loan
package includes at least one covenant with dynamic thresholds, and 0 otherwise. The second
measure, Trend%, is the percentage of ¯nancial covenants that have dynamic thresholds. The
third measure, Trend Slope, is the maximum percentage increase in covenant requirements,
which is taken over all ¯nancial covenants included in the loan package. The fourth measure,
Trend Slope
Maturity
, is equal to the calculated Trend Slope scaled by loan maturity.
The variables that capture ¯rm risk and pro¯tability are: Distance to Default, Capex,
Tobin's Q, Log(Assets), ROA, Leverage, and Loan/PP&E. The loan characteristics included
are Spread, Maturity, an indicator for secured loans (Secured), and the number of covenants
(Total Covenants). In addition, we also include an indicator variable to control for whether
the loan contracts are new credit agreements or amended ones (Amend). We also control for
industry ¯xed-e®ects (´industry) using the Fama-French 48 industries classi¯cation and year-
quarter ¯xed e®ects. Standard errors are clustered at the ¯rm level. Appendix C provides a
detailed description of the variables used in the model.
Panel C of Table 1 reports the results for the determinant models of dynamic covenant
thresholds. The dependent variables are each of the measures for the presence of dynamic
covenant thresholds, respectively. Since nonlinear models, such as Logit and Tobit models,
su®er from the incidental parameter problem in the presence of ¯xed e®ects, we use the
fractional response model (FRM) with correlated random e®ects when the dependent variables
are Trend Dummy and Trend% (Neyman and Scott 1984; Wooldridge 2011). The results of
these four models consistently show that borrowers' credit risk at loan initiation is positively
associated with the presence of ¯nancial covenants with dynamic thresholds. In addition, in
terms of size, leverage, and pro¯tability, ¯rms that accept covenants with dynamic thresholds
appear to be signi¯cantly di®erent from those that accept covenants with constant thresholds.
The loans taken for the former also tend to have larger amounts, longer maturity, and more
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covenants. These pieces of evidence suggest that these two subsamples may not be directly
comparable.
B. Matching
Since the characteristics of borrowers who accept ¯nancial covenants with dynamic thresh-
olds are very di®erent from those who accept ¯nancial covenants with constant thresholds, the
economic costs and bene¯ts of signaling are likely to be di®erent for these two sets of ¯rms.
Therefore, to identify comparable ¯rms, we match loan packages with dynamic covenant
thresholds (the treated group) to those with constant covenant thresholds (the control group)
based on the propensity to include dynamic covenant thresholds in contracts. The propensity
scores are estimated from Model (1), using Trend Dummy as the dependent variable. Speci¯-
cally, for every treated loan package, we select, with replacement, a propensity-matched control
loan package that was originated in the same calendar year and has a propensity score that is
closest to the treated package. We can ¯nd matched loan packages for 2,723 of the 3,007 loan
packages with dynamic covenant thresholds. We report a detailed description of the matching
methodology in Appendix D.
Table 2 compares ¯rm and loan characteristics between those accepting dynamic covenant
thresholds and those accepting constant covenant thresholds. Firm characteristics are mea-
sured as of the ¯scal quarter just before the loan origination date. The treated group and the
matched control groups show similar ¯rm characteristics: they show no signi¯cant di®erences
in all risk and pro¯tability measures except leverage. Firms that accept ¯nancial covenants
with dynamic thresholds have lower leverage than the matched control ¯rms that accept ¯-
nancial covenants with constant thresholds. The di®erence in the means is weakly signi¯cant
at the 10% level. In terms of loan characteristics, the only variable that is signi¯cantly dif-
ferent between the two groups is the average number of ¯nancial covenants. Compared to
statistics based on the original sample, the di®erences in ¯rm and loan characteristics be-
tween ¯rms accepting dynamic covenant thresholds and those accepting constant covenant
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thresholds are signi¯cantly reduced. Our subsequent empirical analyses are all based on the
propensity-matched sample and not the original sample.
C. Impact of Dynamic Covenant Thresholds at Loan Origination
We focus on two direct bene¯ts related to signaling: the cost of loans and the investors'
perception of ¯rm value. We ¯rst analyze whether there is any bene¯t to the loan spreads
for the borrower as a result of agreeing to dynamic covenant thresholds. Then, we investi-
gate whether loan announcement returns are in line with an expected improvement in the
creditworthiness of the borrowers who signal by accepting dynamic covenant thresholds.
C.1. Interest Spread
If accepting ¯nancial covenants with dynamic thresholds di®erentiates borrowers with sim-
ilar credit risk, borrowers may be able to negotiate for a lower interest spread by committing
themselves to comply with increasing covenant requirements. Signaling an improvement in
future performance is likely to lower perceived risk for the lender. Hence, compared with ¯rms
of similar observable characteristics that have accepted constant covenant requirements, ¯rms
accepting ¯nancial covenants with dynamic thresholds are likely to receive lower interest rates,
holding everything else equal. Notably, including a performance pricing provision is not likely
to have the same screening e®ect as including ¯nancial covenants with dynamic thresholds.
This is because the former does not shift creditor control rights to creditors if borrowers fail to
improve their performance as projected, but the latter does shift control rights if this occurs.
We estimate the following model for the propensity-matched sample of loan packages to
examine whether loan packages that include ¯nancial covenants with dynamic thresholds are
associated with lower interest rates (Spread), ceteris paribus.
Spreadit =°0 + °1 ¤ Trend Dummyi;t + °2 ¤ Firm Characteristicsi;t¡1
+ °3 ¤ Loan Characteristicsi;t + ´industry + ºyear¡quarter + "i;t:
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Table 3 presents the results with several model speci¯cations. We ¯nd a signi¯cantly negative
association between interest spreads and Trend Dummy, consistent across all speci¯cations.
When we include all the control variables, interest spreads are 16 basis points lower, on average,
for loan packages with dynamic covenant thresholds (the treated group) than for loan packages
with constant covenant thresholds (the control group), as shown in Column (3). The signs
of coe±cients on other control variables are consistent with the evidence documented in the
prior literature. Our results imply that signaling an improvement in future creditworthiness
is associated with lower loan spreads for borrowers who accept dynamic covenant thresholds.
This ¯nding contributes to the literature on the role of covenants in loan pricing (e.g., Bradley
and Roberts 2015; Goyal 2005).
C.2. Stock market reactions to loan origination announcements
When applying for loans, managers provide projections of future performance as well as
the time-line for ¯rms to meet these projections. If accepting ¯nancial covenants with dynamic
thresholds signals a credible reduction in ¯rms' future credit risk, equity market participants
are likely to respond favorably, because a reduction in credit risk implies a reduction in the
cost of capital. We investigate how the stock market reacts to announcements of loans that
include ¯nancial covenants with dynamic covenant thresholds, relative to the propensity-
matched control group.
The dependent variable of our short term event study is 5-day abnormal returns (-2, +2)
around deal activation date (CAR), where expected returns are estimated from the CAPM
model. To control for the information content implied by multiple covenants, we include
initial covenant strictness at the loan package level, as proposed by Mur¯n (2012). The
results are reported in Table 4. Consistent with our prediction, the coe±cient on Trend
Dummy is signi¯cantly positive. When including ¯nancing purpose ¯xed e®ects, as shown in
Column (2), the 5-day abnormal returns around loan announcements for ¯rms taking loans
with dynamic covenant thresholds are 1.019 percentage points higher than those for their
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matched counterparts. This evidence suggests that accepting ¯nancial covenants with dynamic
thresholds conveys positive information to the equity market, after controlling for other ¯rm
and loan characteristics.
D. Ex post performance of ¯rms accepting dynamic covenant thresholds
In this section, we examine ¯rms' performance after loan origination. First, we evaluate
the credibility of the signal by examining whether borrowers accepting ¯nancial covenants
with dynamic thresholds, on average, exhibit a reduction in future credit risk. We estimate
the following regression on the propensity matched sample:
¢DTDi;(t+1;t+n) =°0 + °1 ¤ Trend Dummyi;t + °2 ¤ Firm Characteristicsi;t¡1
+ °3 ¤ Loan Characteristicsi;t + ´industry + ºyear¡quarter + "i;t;
where the dependent variable ¢DTD represents the changes in credit risk, computed as
distance to default measured at nth quarter after loan origination minus the distance to
default measured at the 1st quarter after loan origination. The ¯rm-level control variables
are measured one quarter before loan origination. Table 5 reports the results when future
credit risk is measured at the 4th, 8th, and 12th quarters, respectively, after loan origination.
The coe±cient of Trend Dummy is positive, and it becomes signi¯cant at the 1% level within
eight quarters after loan origination. Our results suggest that ¯rms accepting covenants with
dynamic thresholds continue to improve their creditworthiness during the 12 quarters that
follow loan origination.
Second, we compare the likelihood of covenant violations between ¯rms that accept covenants
with dynamic thresholds and the matched control sample. If borrowers who accept ¯nancial
covenants with dynamic thresholds are conservative in providing estimates, they may not face
a higher likelihood of covenant violations, since it will be easier to meet the required thresholds
or to commit immaterial violations that do not cause signi¯cant consequences (e.g., narrowly
missing the target). If they intentionally overstate future prospects, or if they are overly opti-
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mistic about their prospects, borrowers accepting ¯nancial covenants with dynamic thresholds
should be more likely to violate covenants after loan origination relative to the borrowers ac-
cepting ¯nancial covenants with constant thresholds .
We link the reported covenant violation to the outstanding loan in the quarter in which
covenant violation occurs. If two or more loan packages are outstanding at the time of covenant
violation, we assume that the ¯rm violated all outstanding loan packages. We make this
assumption because many loan contracts include a cross-default clause that renders a borrower
in default if the borrower defaults on another obligation.7 For our matched sample, about
29.54% of loan contracts have covenants violations. The percentage of observations that have
covenant violations is in the same range as those reported in prior studies: 25% to 32% of
loans in Chava and Roberts (2008) and 25% of ¯rms in Roberts and Su¯ (2009).
We also check the disclosure of covenant violation in the SEC ¯lings for more details.
For ¯rms that accept ¯nancial covenants with dynamic thresholds and also report covenant
violations, 54% disclose which speci¯c covenant was violated (the remaining 46% do not
disclose these details). Among the violations with detailed disclosures, 89% involve ¯nancial
covenants (e.g., Debt/EBITDA), and among these, 96% are violations of covenants with
dynamic thresholds. Therefore, based on the 54% of the sample that we can observe, we
expect that if a ¯rm has covenants with dynamic covenant thresholds, the reported covenant
violation is very likely to be a violation of that covenant. Since we do not know which
covenants the ¯rms violated without the disclosure, we assume that the violation pattern is
similar for the rest of the sample ¯rms that do not disclose this speci¯c information.
We estimate the fractional response model (FRM) to estimate the likelihood of covenant
7In fact, only about 24% of ¯rms in our sample have more than one package outstanding when they violate
covenants.
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violation on the propensity-matched sample:
Violationi =°0 + °1 ¤ Trend Dummyi;t + °2 ¤ Firm Characteristicsi;t¡1
+ °3 ¤ Loan Characteristicsi;t + ´industry + ºyear¡quarter + "i;t;
where Violation is a dummy that equals 1 if a ¯rm violates the covenants in the loan package
i, and 0 otherwise. Firm characteristics are measured at one quarter before loan origination.
Table 6 reports the results. Our results show that ¯rms accepting ¯nancial covenants with
dynamic thresholds are more likely to violate covenants than matched control ¯rms. As shown
in Column (3), with all the control variables, the coe±cient of Trend Dummy is 0.329, which
implies a 5.61 percentage points increase in the likelihood of covenant violation if a borrower
accepts ¯nancial covenants with dynamic thresholds. Combining the results reported in Table
5, we suggest that although ¯rms, on average, continue to improve creditworthiness as signaled,
borrowers who accept dynamic threshold covenants, on average, have a higher likelihood of
failing to deliver expected performance than the borrowers in the matched control group. Even
if the consequences of violating covenants were similar for the treated group and the control
group, a higher likelihood of covenant violations implies higher expected costs of signaling
through dynamic thresholds.
IV. Is there a cost to signaling through dynamic covenant thresholds?
In this section, we analyze whether borrowers that signaled an improvement in their credit-
worthiness incur any costs if their subsequent performance falls short of the signal. Speci¯cally,
we consider the consequences of covenant violations and examine whether they are associated
with signaling through dynamic covenant thresholds at loan initiation.
A. Consequences of covenant violations
For borrowers, covenant violations normally have a negative impact, such as restrictions
on access to credit lines (e.g., Su¯ 2009; Campello et al. 2011), unfavorable changes in
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terms (e.g., higher fees, collateral requirements, or borrowing limits. Chava and Roberts
2008, Acharya, Almeida, Ippolito and Perez-Orive 2014). We examine whether borrowers
who signaled through dynamic covenant thresholds experience more severe consequences. In
the absence of a cost, borrowers may have incentives to provide overly optimistic projections
to negotiate favorable loan terms. Hence, we expect that it will be costly for borrowers to
commit to improve but fail to meet this expectation.
We ¯rst compare the likelihood of receiving a waiver and paying fees on the condition
that a waiver is granted, controlling for ¯rms' concurrent performance at covenant violations.
Decisions about waivers are one of the outcomes of creditor-borrower negotiations, and they
play an important role in how creditor control a®ects ¯rm behavior through contracting.
Next, we examine the impact on ¯rm investment and the lending relationship after a borrower
violates covenants. Creditor intervention over ¯rm investment is one of the major controls that
creditors have over ¯rms and is critical to managers' decisions about seeking debt ¯nancing.
B. Waivers on covenant violations
Covenant violations increase uncertainty about the credibility of borrowers' signals and
the quality of investment projects revealed by management. Creditors are likely to revise
their evaluation of borrowers' creditworthiness based on the updated information revealed
by covenant violations and by their interactions with management during the renegotiation
process. Hence, creditors are likely to react more negatively to covenant violations by borrow-
ers who had signaled an improvement in creditworthiness relative to similar borrowers who
accepted constant covenant thresholds.
One manifestation of more negative creditor reactions is the decreased likelihood of grant-
ing a waiver. Since a package may be violated multiple times, and because lenders may be
stricter on ¯rms that repeatedly violated covenants (e.g., Freudenberg, Imbierowicz, Saunders,
and Ste®en, 2015), we focus on the ¯rst covenant violation for each package. The dependent
variable Waiver is a binary variable, which is equal to 1 if creditors grant a waiver for that
19
covenant violation and 0 otherwise. The ¯rm-level control variables are measured at one
quarter before the covenant violation to control for ¯rms' ¯nancial condition at the time of
covenant violations. We use the fractional response model (FRM) to estimate the likelihood of
receiving a waiver after covenant violations for the propensity-matched sample of loan pack-
ages. Panel A of Table 7 shows the likelihood of receiving a waiver after covenant violation.
When we include all the control variables as shown in Column (3), we ¯nd that borrowers
accepting loans that include ¯nancial covenants with dynamic thresholds face 10.7 percent
points decrease in the likelihood of receiving a waiver. This suggests that lenders tend to have
stronger monitoring incentives for this set of borrowers. This evidence complements the few
recent studies which show that lenders are more likely to grant waivers after covenant viola-
tions when they do not have strong monitoring incentives (see Wang and Xia 2014; Chava,
Wang, and Zou 2017).
C. Waiver fees charged by lenders
When a borrower receives a waiver for a covenant violation, it might need to pay a waiver
fee to the lender. The data on waiver fees are not available in Dealscan or in other commercial
loan databases. We read SEC ¯lings to manually collect the data on the fees for ¯rms that
received a waiver for covenant violations. In many cases, lenders also amend the loan contract
in the meanwhile even if they grant a waiver to the violating ¯rm. Hence, the waiver fees we
report include fees for granting a waiver and amending contracts. The average waiver fee for
our sample is $731,278, and the median fee is $150,000. The average waiver fee as a fraction
of the deal amount is 53 basis points, and the median fee is 20 basis points.
Panel B of Table 7 reports the results on waiver fees. In Column (1), the dependent variable
Waiver Fee Dummy is equal to 1 if a borrower who received the waiver paid a fee for it, and
0 otherwise. In Column (2), the dependent variable, Waiver Fees%, is equal to total fees
paid, scaled by the deal amount.8 Our results shows that, conditional on receiving a waiver
8If a ¯rm does not disclose whether it paid the waiver fee, we set the value to zero.
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after covenant violations, borrowers who had accepted covenants with dynamic thresholds
(treated sample) are more likely to pay a waiver fee and tend to pay higher fees, relative to
the control sample. Column (1) shows that borrowers who had accepted dynamic covenant
thresholds face 4.7 percent points increase in the likelihood of paying a waiver fee after a
covenant violation. Leverage and the total number of ¯nancial covenants included in the loan
package also signi¯cantly increase a borrower's waiver fees.9 Overall, these results indicate
that the costs of violating covenants with dynamic thresholds are higher, even if these ¯rms
received a waiver.
D. Investment cut
Prior studies show that covenant violations lead to a reduction in ¯rm investment (e.g.,
Chava and Roberts 2008; Nini, Smith, and Su¯ 2012). To examine whether the impact
of covenant violations on investment is associated with the presence of dynamic covenant
thresholds, we apply a di®erence-in-di®erences design to compare the changes in investment
expenditure (Capex ) before and after covenant violations. For ¯rms that violate covenants in
the propensity-matched sample, we extract ¯nancial information starting four quarters before
the reported covenant violation to four quarters after covenant violation. Table 8 presents the
results. The variables of interest are the Trend Dummy and the interaction term, Post* Trend
Dummy, where Post is a time dummy, that indicates whether the ¯rm year-quarter is within
four quarters after a covenant violation. All control variables are measured at the concurrent
year-quarter around covenant violations. The coe±cient on Trend Dummy is insigni¯cant
under various model speci¯cations, which suggests that the investment expenditure of ¯rms
that accept ¯nancial covenants with dynamic thresholds is not signi¯cantly di®erent from
that of the control group before covenant violations. The coe±cient on Post*Trend Dummy
is signi¯cantly negative, which is consistent with our expectation that ¯rms accepting ¯nan-
cial covenants with dynamic thresholds experience a greater investment cut after violating
9The result is robust to excluding ¯rms who did not disclose whether they had paid the waiver fee.
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covenants, as shown in Columns (1) and (2). In addition, as shown in Column (2), receiving a
waiver mitigates the investment cut for borrowers accepting ¯nancial covenants with dynamic
thresholds, and this change is weakly signi¯cant at 10% level. However, the investment cut is
still greater for the violations on treated packages, even if borrowers receive a waiver.
E. Lending relationship and interest spread on new loans
Next, we examine whether violating covenants has a negative impact on the lending re-
lationship for borrowers who have signaled an improvement in creditworthiness. First, we
investigate whether borrowers are likely to switch lead lenders for the next new loan taken
after the ¯rst reported covenant violation. We de¯ne the dependent variable Switch Lender
as 1 if the lead lender of the ¯rst loan taken after covenant violation is di®erent from that of
the loan that was violated. The ¯rm-level control variables are measured as of one quarter
before covenant violation, and these loan characteristics are derived from the loan packages for
which covenants were violated. We use a fractional response model to estimate the likelihood
of switching lead lenders. Table 9 reports the results.
Column (1) presents the results when we include all ¯rms that violate covenants. If a ¯rm
does not take any new loans after covenant violation, we set Switch Lender to zero. Column
(2) reports the results for the subsample of ¯rms that take a new loan. The results of both
regressions show that borrowers accepting ¯nancial covenants with dynamic thresholds are
more likely to switch the lead lender for the next loan taken after a covenant violation than
the control group. For borrowers accepting dynamic covenant thresholds, the probability of
switching the lead lender is 3.9 percentage points higher for the sample used in Column (1)
and 5.1 percentage points higher for the sample used in Column (2). This evidence suggests
that violating covenants with dynamic thresholds could lead to an increase in the likelihood
of ending the lending relationship.
Next, we focus on changes in the interest spread for the subsample of ¯rms that take a
new loan after violating covenants. We calculate the di®erence between the interest spread
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on the ¯rst new loan taken after the violation and the interest spread of the original loan
(¢Spread). The ¯rm-level control variables are measured as of the quarter before covenant
violation and the loan characteristics are taken from the loan packages for which covenants
are violated. Table 10 reports the results.
We show that borrowers accepting ¯nancial covenants with dynamic thresholds face a
greater increase in the interest spread, on average, after covenant violations than matched
control ¯rms. As shown in Column (3), violating covenants with increasing thresholds will
lead to an additional increase of 27.9 basis points in the interest spread for the new loan taken.
Furthermore, if borrowers switch lead lenders, they will face an additional 62.2 basis points
increase in the interest spread. These results, taken together with the results of Table 9, are
consistent with our expectation that violating covenants with dynamic thresholds incur more
severe economic consequences than violating covenants with constant thresholds.
V. Discussion
Our results show that the consequences of covenant violations are more severe for ¯rms that
signal an improvement in creditworthiness through dynamic thresholds in ¯nancial covenants.
At the surface level, this result may seem to contradict the conclusions of Demiroglu and
James (2010). This inconsistency arises primarily because of the di®erence in our sample of
signaling ¯rms and in their incentives to signal. Demiroglu and James (2010) show that ¯rms
accepting covenants with tight initial slack have few investment opportunities, so they are
less likely to engage in risk-shifting. In contrast, ¯rms that accept ¯nancial covenants with
dynamic thresholds appear to be riskier and appear to have more investment opportunities.
To further illustrate these di®erences, we conduct the following tests:
First, we examine the changes in investment (¢Capex ) after loan origination, and we
report the results in Table 11. Demiroglu and James (2010) show that ¯rms that accept
tight initial covenant slack show a decrease in investment after loan origination. However, our
results show that ¯rms that accept ¯nancial covenants with dynamic requirements exhibit a
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continuing increase in investment within eight quarters after loan origination.
Second, we ¯nd that ¯rms accepting ¯nancial covenants with dynamic covenant thresholds
are more likely to face investment restrictions. Creditors normally include negative covenants
to mitigate moral hazard and prevent excessive risk taking (Chava, Kumar, and Warga 2010).
Results are reported in Table 12. As shown in Column (1) of Table 12, ¯rms accepting ¯nancial
covenants with dynamic covenant thresholds are also more likely to face a capital expenditure
covenant. This evidence suggests that creditors are concerned about the risk-shifting invest-
ment opportunities of these ¯rms. Column (2) shows that ¯rms accepting ¯nancial covenants
with dynamic covenant thresholds are also more likely to face a time-varying capital expen-
diture covenant that relaxes limits on investment over time. This result suggests that these
¯rms will be allowed to increase investment expenditures if they can improve creditworthiness
as signaled. Column (3) shows that the similar results of time-varying capital expenditure
covenant that relaxes limits on investment over time for the subsample of loan packages with
capital expenditure restrictions.
Third, the ¯rms in Demiroglu and James (2010)'s sample have lower initial covenant
slack. Firms accepting ¯nancial covenants with dynamic thresholds tend to have higher initial
covenant slack, as shown by Li et al. (2016). This evidence suggests that the ¯rms in our
sample are di®erent from those in Demiroglu and James (2010). We further examine the
association between the covenant trend and the overall restrictiveness of covenants at the
package level. Following Mur¯n (2012), we evaluate the overall covenant restrictiveness at the
loan package level based on the joint distribution of the multiple ¯nancial ratios stipulated
in the covenants. Table 13 reports the regression results. We ¯nd that, for ¯rms that accept
increasing thresholds, loan covenants are initially more restrictive at the package level than for
the matched ¯rms, which accept constant covenant thresholds. In addition, we ¯nd that the
overall covenant restrictiveness increases over time for ¯rms that accept increasing thresholds.
This means that temporarily relaxing the requirements of one covenant does not necessarily
suggest that lenders relax overall covenant restrictiveness.
24
Overall, the evidence suggests that ¯rms with a relatively high default risk and with
more investment opportunities signal an improvement in future creditworthiness by accepting
covenants with dynamic thresholds. Lenders still tend to maintain control over borrowers'
investments through capital expenditure covenants, and they agree to contractually relax
investment restrictions if ¯rms improve their creditworthiness as expected. A ¯rm's failure to
meet expectations raises red °ags regarding the credibility of the information revealed at loan
initiation and the quality of the investment projects. Therefore, the observed consequences
of covenant violations in our paper are more severe and the opposite of those documented in
Demiroglu and James (2010), because creditors have di®erent incentives to manage risk when
¯rms signal through ¯nancial covenants with dynamic thresholds.
In untabulated results, we also examine whether supply-side factors are associated with
the use of dynamic thresholds in loan covenants. We consider two supply-side factors: (a)
HighRep, which denotes lenders that have better reputations, as de¯ned in Drucker and Puri
(2009), and (b) Default Experience, which measures lenders' recent default experiences, as
de¯ned in Mur¯n (2012). We ¯nd limited evidence that these two factors explain dynamic
thresholds. More importantly, our main results remain robust to controlling for supply-side
factors.
VI. Conclusion
We investigate the economic consequences of borrowers signaling through ¯nancial covenants
with dynamic thresholds that are present in about 35% of loan packages with covenants. Bor-
rowers can signal their type to di®erentiate themselves from other borrowers for debt ¯nancing,
and accepting ¯nancial covenants with dynamic thresholds signals an improvement in future
creditworthiness. However, such signals are largely based on managerial projections of the
¯rm's performance. There is limited evidence on whether such signaling is credible and how
borrowers and creditors renegotiate after covenant violations.
Our results indicate that ¯rms that accept ¯nancial covenants with dynamic thresholds
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receive a lower interest spread and have more positive equity market reactions to loan an-
nouncements compared to the matched control group that has ¯nancial covenants with con-
stant thresholds. Ex post, ¯rms accepting dynamic thresholds continue to reduce their credit
risk in the three years after loan origination. However, they are also more likely to violate
covenants. After violating covenants, ¯rms that accept ¯nancial covenants with dynamic
thresholds are less likely to receive a waiver. They are also more likely to pay higher waiver
fees if they do receive the waiver as well as cut investment more, relative to the matched
group, which has similar ¯rm and loan characteristics but only accepts covenants with con-
stant thresholds. If they take out a new loan after violating ¯nancial covenants with dynamic
thresholds, borrowers also tend to switch lead lenders and pay a higher interest rate for their
subsequent loans. These results are consistent with our expectations that signaling an im-
provement in creditworthiness tends to lead to more severe consequences if ¯rms fail to deliver
the performance as signaled.
Our study extends prior studies on signaling in debt markets by examining the credibility
of signaling and the interactions between creditors and borrowers if borrowers fail to deliver the
performance as signaled. We focus on a unique type of signaling through ¯nancial covenants,
which are associated with managers' projections on the performance of investment. We show
that both the information revealed at loan initiation and the updated information observed
when covenant violations occur is associated with creditors' decisions. To our knowledge, we
are also the ¯rst to document large-sample empirical evidence regarding lenders' decisions on
waivers of covenant violations and waiver fees. Waiver decisions are closely related to creditor
control over borrowers, and they a®ect ¯rms' incentives in both signaling through contracting
and risk-taking behavior ex post. We contribute to the literature on contract design by
investigating how contract terms are interrelated and how they can help mitigate the adverse
selection that arises from asymmetric information and risk dynamics. Our evidence sheds
additional lights on how banks utilize ¯rm private information to di®erentiate borrowers and
monitor ¯rm performance over the life of a loan so they can make informed decisions.
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Appendices
Appendix A: An Example of a Financial Covenant with Dynamic Covenant Thresholds
The following excerpt is from the loan contract signed on March 15, 1996 for Rite Aid
Corp to ¯nance a merger:
Administrative Agent Morgan Guaranty Trust (6.0%)






Co-agents (3.6%) ABN AMRO Bank N.V.













Ratio = Consolidated EBIT + consolidated rent to consolidated interest charges + con-
solidated rent. Restructuring and similar charges related to the merger will not be used in the
ratio calculation, provided the aggregate pre-tax amount of such charges is <= $163 million.
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Appendix B: Text Search Algorithm
We start with the data on covenant violation available at Michael Roberts' website (see
Roberts and Su¯, 2009). The original data ends at 2012 Q1. We extend the sample period
of the data by collecting covenant violation information directly from 10-K, 10-Q, and 8-K
SEC ¯lings from 2012 Q2 to 2015 Q4. We modify the methodology employed Roberts and
Su¯ (2009) to automate collection of information related to covenant violations and to reduce
false positive.
To improve the accuracy of our text search, we tested our algorithm using randomly
selected quarters (i.e., the training sample) numerous times and revised the key words and
search restrictions until we obtained an out-of-sample Type 1 and the Type 2 error rates of less
than 5%. For our ¯nal algorithm, the Type 1 error rate is 2%, and Type 2 error rate is 3.55%.
We further test this algorithm using the sample available at Michael Roberts' website. Our
algorithm successfully locates 96.45% of violations for the 10-Ks, 8-Ks, and 10-Qs reported in
his sample before any manual corrections.
Our ¯nal algorithm includes two steps. In the ¯rst step, the algorithm searches for the
following keywords related to covenants, such as "covenant ratio", "interest coverage", "¯xed
charge", \loan to value", \leverage", \debt to equity", \debt to tangible net worth", \debt to
net worth", \debt coverage", \debt service", \debt to ebitda", \ebitda requirement". If the al-
gorithm can locate any of these keywords, it continues to search for the following terms within
the same sentence of the initial hit: \violated", \breached", \defaulted", \failed to comply",
\resulting in default", \resulting in a default", \resulting in event of default", \resulting in an
event of default", \was in breach", \was in noncompliance", \was in non-compliance", \was
not in compliance", \was in default", \was in technical default", \was in violation", \were in
breach", \were in noncompliance", \were in non-compliance", \were not in compliance", \were
in default", \were in technical default", \were in violation", "are in breach", \are in noncom-
pliance", \are in non-compliance", "are not in compliance", \are in default", \are in technical
default", "are in violation", \is in breach", \is in noncompliance", \is in non-compliance", \is
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not in compliance", \is in default", \is in technical default", \is in violation", \resulted in
a breach", \resulted in noncompliance", \resulted in non-compliance", \resulted in default",
\resulted in technical default", \resulted in a technical fault", \resulted in violation", \re-
sulting in breach", \resulting in noncompliance", \resulting in non-compliance", \resulting
in default", \resulting in technical default", \resulting in violation", \represents a breach",
\represents a noncompliance", \represents a non-compliance", \represents a default", \repre-
sents a technical default", \represents a violation". In addition, we also search for the terms
\in compliance" and \complied" followed by the word \except" in the same sentence of the
initial hit. In the second step, we search again through all the matches identi¯ed in the ¯rst
step and eliminate those hits in which any of the following texts appears in the same sentence:
\allege", \alleged", \allegation", \lawsuit", \legal", \implied covenant", \defendant", \plain-
ti®", would", \will", \can", \could", \if", \may", \might", \shall", \should", \customary",
\future", \inability", \in past", \in the past", \time to time", \no", \none", \not", \nothing"
and the words \viol", \breach", \default", \compl".
We use a similar methodology to obtain data on covenant waivers. The algorithm
searches for the text \waiv" within three lines before and after the line in which covenant
violation information is disclosed. Next, we eliminate those matches in which any of the
following texts appears in the same sentence as \waiv": \not", receiv", \unable to", \being
sought", \cannot assure", \no assurance", \failure to" \discussion", \if", \may", \might",
\seeking", \no", \none", \not", \nothing".
To form the ¯nal sample for our covenant violation tests, we merge the following: (a)
the violation data from Amir Su¯'s website,(b) Michael Robert's data, and (c) our extended
dataset from 2012 to 2015.
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Appendix C: Variable De¯nitions
Distance to Default: The number of standard deviations from the default threshold,
estimated using the KMV Merton model as in Bharath and Shumway
(2008).
Capex: Capital expenditures scaled by the book value of assets.
Tobin's Q: Market value of assets scaled by the replacement value of ¯rm assets.
Assets: The total value of a ¯rm's book assets (in millions of USD).
ROA: Income before extraordinary items, divided by total assets.
Leverage: The total amount of debt divided by total assets.
Loan/PP&E: The total amount of the loan granted, scaled by net property, plant,
and equipment.
Spread: Interest spread on the package, in basis points.
Maturity: The maximum number of months to loan maturity granted under
the package.
Total Covenants: Total number of covenants.
Secured: A binary variable equal to 1 if the loan is collateralized and 0
otherwise.
Amend: A binary variable equal to 1 if the loan is an amended loan.
Strictness: Covenant restrictiveness at loan package level, as proposed by Mur¯n
(2012).
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Appendix D: Propensity Matching
We start with 8,729 loan packages (3,007 loan packages with dynamic covenant thresh-
olds and 5,722 packages with constant thresholds) by 3,328 unique ¯rms in the merged
CRSP/Compustat & Dealscan database for the period 1996 to 2012, with nonmissing values
of size, Tobin's Q, ROA, leverage, investments, distance to default, loan to tangible assets,
loan maturity, number of covenants, and loan spread. We estimate the propensity to include
¯nancial covenants with dynamic thresholds in credit agreement, using the model described
in Equation (1). We omit observations that are not on common support. For every signal
loan package with dynamic covenant thresholds (treatment group), we search for a propensity-
matched package that was originated in the same calendar year and does not include covenants
with dynamic covenant thresholds (control group). That is, for every treated package, we se-
lect (with replacement) a control package that was originated in the same calendar year and
is closest to the treated package in terms of the propensity to include ¯nancial covenants
with dynamic thresholds. Following this procedure, we are able to match 2,723 treated loan
packages to 2,723 control loan packages. Before matching, ¯rms taking loans that included
¯nancial covenants with dynamic thresholds are signi¯cantly di®erent from those taking loans
that include ¯nancial covenants with constant thresholds in terms of ¯rm and loan character-
istics. After the matching, the sample of treated packages shows similar characteristics as the
matched control group, as shown in Table 2.
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Table 1: Panel A: Dynamic Thresholds in Financial Covenants
This table reports the number of loan packages that include each type of ¯nancial covenant, the number of
loan packages that include the speci¯c ¯nancial covenant with dynamic thresholds, and the percentage of
loan packages that include the speci¯c ¯nancial covenant with dynamic thresholds.
Types of No. of Pkgs. No.of Pkgs. % of Pkgs.
Financial Covenants with the with Dynamic with Dynamic
Covenant Covenant Covenant
Thresholds Thresholds
Min. EBITDA 736 432 58.70%
Max. Senior Debt to EBITDA 818 415 50.73%
Max. Debt to EBITDA 4830 2014 41.70%
Min. Cash Interest Coverage 92 29 31.52%
Min. Interest Coverage 3252 870 26.75%
Min. Fixed Charge Coverage 3100 821 26.48%
Max. Loan to Value 8 2 25.00%
Min. Quick Ratio 188 38 20.21%
Max. Senior Leverage 11 2 18.18%
Max. Debt to Tangible Net Worth 650 116 17.85%
Min. Debt Service Coverage 508 85 16.73%
Max. Debt to Equity 48 8 16.67%
Max. Leverage ratio 1583 176 11.12%
Min. Current Ratio 827 51 6.17%
Net Worth 1527 0 0.00%
Tangible Net Worth 1359 0 0.00%
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Table 1: Panel B: Nominal Initial Thresholds and Changes in Covenant Requirements
This table presents initial threshold levels for covenants with dynamic thresholds and for the sample with
constant thresholds. The table also reports the percentage increases in covenant requirements over the life of
the loan contracts for covenants with dynamic thresholds. For the Min EBITDA covenant, we scale the
dollar amount requirements by ¯rms' total assets of the year before entering the loan contract. The
percentage increase in covenant requirement is calculated as, (¯nal ratio-initial ratio)/initial ratio. For Max
(Senior) Debt-to-EBITDA and leverage related covenants, we multiply the percentage change by -1 since the
¯nal covenant thresholds are lower than the initial ones.
% Increase in Requirement
Financial Covenant Type Initial Thresholds for the Covenant with
Dynamic Thresholds
Dynamic Constant Mean Median
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Max. Debt to EBITDA 4.33 3.40 24% 21%
Max. Debt to Equity 2.55 1.94 19% 19%
Max. Debt to Tangible Net Worth 3.06 1.77 25% 20%
Max. Leverage ratio 0.68 0.58 14% 11%
Max. Loan to Value 2.23 2.00 12% 12%
Max. Senior Debt to EBITDA 3.47 2.71 29% 25%
Max. Senior Leverage 0.75 0.45 17% 17%
Min. Cash Interest Coverage 1.42 2.17 54% 32%
Min. Current Ratio 1.12 1.33 23% 20%
Min. Debt Service Coverage 1.33 1.44 32% 17%
Min. EBITDA 0.07 0.10 262% 60%
Min. Fixed Charge Coverage 1.29 1.46 46% 19%
Min. Interest Coverage 2.27 2.75 42% 30%
Min. Quick Ratio 0.91 1.05 41% 23%
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Table 1: Panel C: Determinants of the Presence of Dynamic Covenant Thresholds
This table reports the tests on the determinants of dynamic covenant thresholds in loan packages. FRM
stands for the fractional response model with logit link function, and OLS stands for the linear regression
model. Trend Dummy is equal to 1 if the loan package includes at least one covenant with dynamic
thresholds, and 0 otherwise. Trend% is percentage of covenants with dynamic thresholds. Trend Slope, is the
maximum percentage increase in covenant requirements from its initial thresholds to the ¯nal thresholds,
where the maximum is taken over all ¯nancial covenants of the loan package. Firm characteristics are
measured as of the quarter before loan origination. Distance to Default is estimated using the KMV Merton
model (Bharath and Shumway, 2008). Capex is capital expenditures scaled by the book value of assets.
Tobin's Q is the market value of assets scaled by the replacement value of ¯rm assets. Book Assets is the
book value of total assets in millions of USD. ROA is income before extraordinary items, divided by the total
assets. Leverage is the total amount of debt, divided by the total assets. Loan/PP&E is the total amount of
the loan granted under the package in millions scaled by net property, plant, and equipment. Spread is the
interest spread on the package in basis points. Maturity is the maximum number of months before loan
maturity granted under the package. Total Covenants is the total number of covenants. Secured equals 1 if
the loan is collateralized, and 0 otherwise. Amend equals 1 if the package is an amended loan. The robust
standard errors clustered by ¯rms are reported in parentheses. ¤ ¤ ¤p < 0:01; ¤ ¤ p < 0:05; ¤p < 0:1:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trend Dummy Trend% Trend Slope Trend Slope/
Maturity
FRM FRM OLS OLS
Distance to Default -0.054*** -0.049*** -1.361*** -0.057***
(0.010) (0.008) (0.490) (0.021)
Capex -2.478 -2.042 50.871 0.992
(1.690) (1.256) (52.626) (1.880)
Tobin's Q -0.005 -0.039 2.390* 0.060
(0.034) (0.026) (1.295) (0.054)
Log(Assets) 0.094*** 0.043** 1.803** 0.078**
(0.028) (0.019) (0.751) (0.032)
ROA -2.168** -0.242 -99.496** -2.736
(1.041) (0.617) (47.373) (1.813)
Leverage 0.709*** 0.545*** -23.951** -1.127**
(0.204) (0.126) (12.142) (0.532)
Loan/PP&E 0.016*** 0.008*** 0.235 0.005
(0.006) (0.003) (0.227) (0.008)
Spread 0.317*** 0.163*** 10.722*** 0.361***
(0.038) (0.020) (1.209) (0.056)
Log (Maturity) 0.492*** 0.274*** (1.282) -0.744***
(0.060) (0.047) (1.947) (0.152)
Secured -0.134 -0.107 2.507 0.131
(0.085) (0.066) (1.812) (0.083)
Log (Total Covenants) 1.877*** 0.347*** 12.961*** 0.385***
(0.079) (0.062) (2.952) (0.130)
Amend 0.048 0.006 -1.657 -0.039
(0.067) (0.053) (3.148) (0.140)
Observations 8,729 8,729 8,729 8,729
R-squared 0.295 0.071 0.059 0.046
Industry & Year-Qtr FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
37
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics: Firm and Loan Characteristics for the Propensity-Matched
Sample
This table reports the statistics on ¯rm and loan characteristics for the treatment sample and the
propensity-matched sample, respectively. Distance to default is estimated using the KMV Merton model
(Bharath and Shumway, 2008). Capex is capital expenditures scaled by the book value of assets. Tobin's Q
is the market value of assets scaled by the replacement value of ¯rm assets. Book Assets is the book value of
total assets in millions of USD. ROA is income before extraordinary items, divided by total assets. Leverage
is the total amount of debt, divided by the total assets. Loan/PP&E is the total amount of the loan granted
under the package in millions scaled by net property, plant, and equipment. Spread is the interest spread on
the package in basis points. Maturity is the maximum number of months to loan maturity granted under the
package. Total Covenants is the total number of covenants. Secured equals 1 if the loan is collateralized, and
0 otherwise. Amend equals 1 if the package is an amended loan. The table also reports whether the
di®erences in means by t-test are statistically signi¯cant. ¤ ¤ ¤p < 0:01; ¤ ¤ p < 0:05; ¤p < 0:1:
Constant Thresholds Dynamic Thresholds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean Std. Dev. Median Mean Std. Dev. Median
Distance to Default 4.776 4.007 4.255 5.076 4.153 4.322
Capex 0.017 0.020 0.011 0.017 0.021 0.010
Tobin's Q 1.328 0.821 1.100 1.378 0.894 1.103
Assets 2007.735 4650.006 513.190 1930.590 4363.676 483.778
ROA 0.003 0.031 0.008 0.006 0.028 0.008
Leverage 0.341 0.218 0.332 0.320 0.207 0.311*
Loan/PP&E 3.535 8.152 1.202 3.843 8.013 1.375
Spread 249.932 170.588 212.500 234.215 130.114 225.000
Maturity 49.842 22.640 50.000 51.058 20.936 59.000
Total Covenants 6.305 2.424 6.000 6.683 2.742 7.000***
Secured 0.752 0.432 1.000 0.738 0.440 1.000
Amend 0.739 0.439 1.000 0.738 0.440 1.000
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Table 3: Dynamic Covenant Thresholds and Loan Spreads for the Propensity-Matched Sample
This table reports the e®ect of the presence of increasing covenant thresholds on loan spreads using the
propensity-matched sample. The dependent variable Spread is the initial interest spread in basis points.
Trend Dummy equals 1 if the loan package includes one or more covenants with dynamic thresholds, and 0
otherwise. Distance to Default is estimated using the KMV Merton model (Bharath and Shumway, 2008).
Capex is capital expenditures scaled by the book value of assets. Tobin's Q is the market value of assets
scaled by the replacement value of ¯rm assets. Book Assets is the book value of total assets in millions of
USD. ROA is income before extraordinary items, divided by the total assets. Leverage is the total amount of
debt, divided by the total assets. Loan/PP&E is the total amount of the loan granted under the package in
millions scaled by net property, plant, and equipment. Financial variables are measured as of the quarter
before loan origination. Maturity is the maximum number of months before loan maturity granted under the
package. Total Covenants is the total number of covenants. Secured equals 1 if the loan is collateralized, and
0 otherwise. Amend equals 1 if the package is an amended loan. The robust standard errors clustered by
¯rms are reported in parentheses. ¤ ¤ ¤p < 0:01; ¤ ¤ p < 0:05; ¤p < 0:1:
(1) (2) (3)
Spread Spread Spread
Trend Dummy -15.522** -15.961** -15.980**
(7.557) (6.703) (6.694)




Tobin's Q -3.079 -3.048
(3.162) (3.132)








Log (Maturity) -15.433** -15.105**
(6.015) (6.013)






Observations 5,446 5,446 5,446
R-squared 0.189 0.381 0.382
Industry & Year-Qtr FE Yes Yes Yes
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Table 4: Loan Announcement Returns for the Propensity-Matched Sample
This table examines loan announcement e®ects. CAR [-2,2] denotes 5-day CAR (%) around the deal active
date. Trend Dummy is equal to 1 if the loan package includes at least one covenant with dynamic thresholds,
and 0 otherwise. Distance to Default is estimated using the KMV Merton model (Bharath and Shumway,
2008). Capex is capital expenditures scaled by the book value of assets. Tobin's Q is the market value of
assets scaled by the replacement value of ¯rm assets. Book Assets is the book value of total assets in millions
of USD. ROA is income before extraordinary items, divided by the total assets. Leverage is the total amount
of debt, divided by the total assets. Loan/PP&E is the total amount of the loan granted under the package
in millions scaled by net property, plant, and equipment. Spread is the interest spread on the package in
basis points. Maturity is the maximum number of months before loan maturity granted under the package.
Total Covenants is the total number of covenants. Secured equals 1 if the loan is collateralized, and 0
otherwise. Amend equals 1 if the package is an amended loan. Strictness is overall covenant restrictiveness,
estimated at the package level following Mur¯n (2012). The robust standard errors clustered by ¯rms are
reported in parentheses. ¤ ¤ ¤p < 0:01; ¤ ¤ p < 0:05; ¤p < 0:1:
(1) (2)
CAR [-2,+2] CAR [-2,+2]
Trend Dummy 0.944** 1.019***
(0.366) (0.367)




Tobin's Q -0.427* -0.425*
(0.239) (0.243)










Log (Maturity) 0.170 0.069
(0.376) (0.387)










Industry & Year-Qtr FE Yes Yes
Deal Purpose FE No Yes
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Table 5: Change in Risk after Loan Origination for the Propensity-Matched Sample
This table compares the changes in creditworthiness after loan origination for packages with dynamic
thresholds with the changes in creditworthiness for the propensity-matched packages with constant
thresholds. The dependent variable, ¢DTD(1; t); is computed as the distance to default measured t quarters
after loan origination minus the distance to default measured at the quarter after loan origination. Trend
Dummy equals 1 if the loan package includes one or more covenants with dynamic thresholds, and 0
otherwise. Distance to Default is estimated using the KMV Merton model (Bharath and Shumway, 2008).
Capex is capital expenditures scaled by the book value of assets. Tobin's Q is the market value of assets
scaled by the replacement value of ¯rm assets. Book Assets is the book value of total assets in millions of
USD. ROA is income before extraordinary items, divided by the total assets. Leverage is the total amount of
debt, divided by the total assets. Loan/PP&E is the total amount of the loan granted under the package in
millions scaled by net property, plant, and equipment. Financial variables are measured as of the quarter
before loan origination. Spread is the interest spread on the package in basis points. Maturity is the
maximum number of months before loan maturity granted under the package. Total Covenants is the total
number of covenants. Secured equals 1 if the loan is collateralized, and 0 otherwise. Amend equals 1 if the
package is an amended loan. The robust standard errors clustered by ¯rms are reported in parentheses.
¤ ¤ ¤p < 0:01; ¤ ¤ p < 0:05; ¤p < 0:1:
(1) (2) (3)
¢DTD [+1,+4] ¢DTD [1,+8] ¢DTD [+1,+12]
Trend Dummy 0.214* 0.467*** 0.528***
(0.118) (0.169) (0.194)
Capex -4.020 -2.504 -0.736
(3.195) (4.726) (5.517)
Tobin's Q -0.055 -0.188 0.044
(0.081) (0.116) (0.136)
Log (Assets) 0.035 0.029 0.186***
(0.043) (0.055) (0.068)
ROA 1.124 4.243 -4.154
(1.969) (2.628) (3.587)
Leverage 0.516 0.217 -0.340
(0.426) (0.487) (0.590)
Loan/PP&E -0.017** -0.012 -0.025
(0.007) (0.011) (0.017)
Secured 0.132 -0.114 0.011
(0.156) (0.234) (0.245)
Log (Maturity) -0.171 -0.470*** -0.475**
(0.124) (0.174) (0.192)
Log (Total Covenants) -0.078 0.034 0.152
(0.135) (0.198) (0.217)
Spread 0.017 0.139 0.321**
(0.102) (0.115) (0.130)
Amend 0.007 -0.097 0.204
(0.135) (0.195) (0.230)
Observations 4,319 3,941 3,706
R-squared 0.202 0.301 0.366
Industry & Year-Qtr FE Yes Yes Yes
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Table 6: Likelihood of Covenant Violation for the Propensity-Matched Sample
This table reports the tests on the likelihood of covenant violations using the fractional regression model on
the propensity-matched sample of loan packages. The dependent variable Violation equals 1 if a ¯rm is in
violation of a covenant while the package is outstanding. Trend Dummy equals 1 if the loan package includes
one or more covenants with dynamic thresholds, and 0 otherwise. Distance to Default is estimated using the
KMV Merton model (Bharath and Shumway, 2008). Capex is capital expenditures scaled by the book value
of assets. Tobin's Q is the market value of assets scaled by the replacement value of ¯rm assets. Book Assets
is the book value of total assets in millions of USD. ROA is income before extraordinary items, divided by
the total assets. Leverage is the total amount of debt, divided by the total assets. Loan/PP&E is the total
amount of the loan granted under the package in millions scaled by net property, plant, and equipment.
Financial variables are measured as of the quarter before loan origination. Spread is the interest spread on
the package in basis points. Maturity is the maximum number of months before loan maturity granted under
the package. Total Covenants is the total number of covenants. Secured equals 1 if the loan is collateralized,
and 0 otherwise. Amend equals 1 if the package is an amended loan. The robust standard errors clustered by
¯rms are reported in parentheses. ¤ ¤ ¤p < 0:01; ¤ ¤ p < 0:05; ¤p < 0:1:
(1) (2) (3)
Violation Violation Violation
Trend Dummy 0.292*** 0.324*** 0.329***
(0.101) (0.103) (0.103)




Tobin's Q -0.017 -0.022
(0.069) (0.068)










Log (Maturity) 0.575*** 0.569***
(0.106) (0.107)






Observations 5,446 5,446 5,446
Pseudo R-squared 0.094 0.176 0.181
Industry & Year-Qtr FE Yes Yes Yes
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Table 7: Panel A: Likelihood of Receiving Waiver after First Covenant Violation for the
Propensity-Matched Sample
This table reports the results on the likelihood of a waiver conditional on covenant violation using the
fractional response model. The dependent variable Waiver equals 1 if creditors grant a waiver for that
covenant violation, and 0 otherwise. We control for ¯nancial performance measured at the quarter before
covenant violation. Trend Dummy equals 1 if the loan package includes one or more covenants with dynamic
thresholds, and 0 otherwise. Distance to Default is estimated using the KMV Merton model (Bharath and
Shumway, 2008). Capex is capital expenditures scaled by the book value of assets. Tobin's Q is the market
value of assets scaled by the replacement value of ¯rm assets. Book Assets is the book value of total assets in
millions of USD. ROA is income before extraordinary items, divided by the total assets. Leverage is the total
amount of debt, divided by the total assets. Loan/PP&E is the total amount of the loan granted under the
package in millions scaled by net property, plant, and equipment. Financial variables are measured at the
quarter before reported covenant violation. Spread is the interest spread on the package in basis points.
Maturity is the maximum number of months before loan maturity granted under the package. Total
Covenants is the total number of covenants. Secured equals 1 if the loan is collateralized, and 0 otherwise.
Amend equals 1 if the package is an amended loan. The robust standard errors clustered by ¯rms are
reported in parentheses. ¤ ¤ ¤p < 0:01; ¤ ¤ p < 0:05; ¤p < 0:1:
(1) (2) (3)
Model: FRM Waiver Waiver Waiver
Trend Dummy -0.351** -0.438*** -0.432***
(0.156) (0.169) (0.170)




Tobin's Q 0.016 0.036
(0.179) (0.187)










Log (Maturity) 0.020 0.016
(0.193) (0.192)






Observations 883 883 883
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.091 0.130 0.136
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Table 7: Panel B: Likelihood of PayingWaiver Fees after the First Violation for the Propensity-
Matched Sample
This table reports the results of the determinants of waiver fees conditional on a ¯rm receiving a waiver. The
dependent variable Waiver Fee Dummy is equal to 1 if a ¯rm pays waiver fees, and 0 otherwise. The
dependent variable Waiver Fees% is equal to the total amount of fees paid scaled by the deal amount. Our
sample consists of ¯rst covenant violations on the propensity-matched sample of loan packages. We control
for ¯nancial information before covenant violation. Trend Dummy equals 1 if the loan package includes one
or more covenants with dynamic thresholds, and 0 otherwise. Distance to Default is estimated using the
KMV Merton model (Bharath and Shumway, 2008). Capex is capital expenditures scaled by the book value
of assets. Tobin's Q is the market value of assets scaled by the replacement value of ¯rm assets. Book Assets
is the book value of total assets in millions of USD. ROA is income before extraordinary items, divided by
the total assets. Leverage is the total amount of debt, divided by the total assets. Loan/PP&E is the total
amount of the loan granted under the package in millions scaled by net property, plant, and equipment.
Financial variables are measured at the quarter before the reported covenant violation. Spread is the interest
spread on the package in basis points. Maturity is the maximum number of months before loan maturity
granted under the package. Total Covenants is the total number of covenants. Secured equals 1 if the loan is
collateralized, and 0 otherwise. Amend equals 1 if the package is an amended loan. The robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses. ¤ ¤ ¤p < 0:01; ¤ ¤ p < 0:05; ¤p < 0:1:
(1) (2)
Model: FRM Waiver Fee Dummy Waiver Fees%
Trend Dummy 0.473* 0.969***
(0.252) (0.361)




Tobin's Q 0.073 0.063
(0.334) (0.579)










Log (Maturity) -0.588** 0.188
(0.295) (0.331)







Industry FE Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.280 0.146
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Table 8: Investment Cuts after First Covenant Violation for the Propensity-Matched Sample
This table reports the results on changes in investment before and after a covenant violation for
propensity-matched loan packages using a di®erence-in-di®erences design. We restrict the package
year-quarter observations to be within four quarters around the ¯rst covenant violation. The dependent
variable, Capex, is the capital expenditures scaled by the book value of assets. Trend Dummy is equal to 1 if
the loan package includes one or more covenants with dynamic thresholds, and 0 otherwise. Post is equal to
1 if the package year quarter observation is on or within 4 quarters after a covenant violation, and 0
otherwise. Waiver is 1 if creditors grant a waiver for that covenant violation, and 0 otherwise. Distance to
Default is estimated using the KMV Merton model (Bharath and Shumway, 2008). Tobin's Q is the market
value of assets scaled by the replacement value of ¯rm assets. Book Assets is the book value of total assets in
millions of USD. ROA is income before extraordinary items, divided by the total assets. Leverage is the total
amount of debt, divided by the total assets. Loan/PP&E is the total amount of the loan granted under the
package in millions scaled by net property, plant, and equipment. Total Covenants is the total number of
covenants. Secured equals 1 if the loan is collateralized, and 0 otherwise. The robust standard errors
clustered by ¯rms are reported in parentheses. ¤ ¤ ¤p < 0:01; ¤ ¤ p < 0:05; ¤p < 0:1:
(1) (2)
Capex Capex
Trend Dummy 0.153 0.245
(0.188) (0.190)
Post x Trend Dummy -0.576*** -0.486***
(0.141) (0.140)
Waiver x Post -0.293* -0.206
(0.166) (0.160)
Trend Dummy x Waiver x Post 0.477** 0.372*
(0.212) (0.203)


















Industry & Year-Qtr FE Yes Yes
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Table 9: Lending Relationship after First Covenant Violation for the Propensity-Matched
Sample
This table reports the results of the likelihood of switching lenders following covenant violations for the
propensity-matched sample. The sample used in Column (1) includes borrowers that either take or do not
take new loans following a covenant violation. The sample used in Column (2) includes only borrowers who
take new loans. Switch lender is a dummy that equals 1 if the borrower switches to a di®erent lead lender for
the ¯rst loan taken after a covenant violation. If a ¯rm does not take any new loans after a covenant
violation, we set Switch Lender to 0. Trend Dummy equals 1 if the loan package includes one or more
covenants with dynamic thresholds, and 0 otherwise. Distance to Default is estimated using the KMV
Merton model (Bharath and Shumway, 2008). Capex is capital expenditures scaled by the book value of
assets. Tobin's Q is the market value of assets scaled by the replacement value of ¯rm assets. Book Assets is
the book value of total assets in millions of USD. ROA is income before extraordinary items, divided by the
total assets. Leverage is the total amount of debt, divided by the total assets. Loan/PP&E is the total
amount of the loan granted under the package in millions scaled by net property, plant, and equipment.
Financial variables are measured at the quarter before reported covenant violation. Spread is the interest
spread on the package in basis points. Maturity is the maximum number of months before loan maturity
granted under the package. Total Covenants is the total number of covenants. Secured equals 1 if the loan is
collateralized, and 0 otherwise. Amend equals 1 if the package is an amended loan. The robust standard
errors clustered by ¯rms are reported in parentheses. ¤ ¤ ¤p < 0:01; ¤ ¤ p < 0:05; ¤p < 0:1:
(1) (2)
Switch Lender Switch Lender
Trend dummy 0.394*** 0.511***
(0.119) (0.173)
Distance to Default -0.075*** -0.132***
(0.025) (0.036)
Tobin's Q 0.378*** 0.047
(0.138) (0.191)














Log (Maturity) -0.025 0.345*
(0.141) (0.193)





Pseudo R-squared 0.088 0.155
Industry FE Yes Yes
46
Table 10: Interest Spread of the New Loan Taken after First Covenant Violation for the
Propensity-Matched Sample
The table compares changes in the interest spread for the ¯rst loan taken after covenant violation. ¢Spread
is de¯ned as the interest rate of the ¯rst loan taken after a covenant violation minus the interest rate of the
loan in violation. Switch lender is a dummy that equals 1 if the borrower switches to a di®erent lead lender
for the ¯rst loan taken after covenant violation. Trend Dummy equals 1 if the loan package includes one or
more covenants with dynamic thresholds, and 0 otherwise. Distance to Default is estimated using the KMV
Merton model (Bharath and Shumway, 2008). Capex is capital expenditures scaled by the book value of
assets. Tobin's Q is the market value of assets scaled by the replacement value of ¯rm assets. Book Assets is
the book value of total assets in millions of USD. ROA is income before extraordinary items, divided by the
total assets. Leverage is the total amount of debt, divided by the total assets. Loan/PP&E is the total
amount of the loan granted under the package in millions scaled by net property, plant, and equipment.
Financial variables are measured at the quarter of reported covenant violation. Spread is the interest spread
on the package in basis points. Maturity is the maximum number of months before loan maturity granted
under the package. Total Covenants is the total number of covenants. Secured equals 1 if the loan is
collateralized, and 0 otherwise. Amend equals 1 if the package is an amended loan. The robust standard
errors clustered by ¯rms are reported in parentheses. ¤ ¤ ¤p < 0:01; ¤ ¤ p < 0:05; ¤p < 0:1:
(1) (2) (3)
¢Spread ¢Spread ¢Spread
Trend Dummy 34.611** 27.910**
(14.110) (13.698)
Switch Lender 65.593*** 62.227***
(13.913) (13.638)
Distance to Default -6.314*** -4.745** -4.658*
(2.377) (2.348) (2.373)
Tobin's Q -11.441 -13.717 -11.844
(13.752) (13.590) (13.556)
Log (Assets) 4.163 5.641 5.589
(5.352) (5.280) (5.315)
ROA -572.893*** -548.968*** -561.065***
(176.040) (178.268) (177.068)
Leverage 51.380* 62.859** 59.390*
(31.107) (31.096) (31.079)
Capex 959.878* 823.841* 831.376*
(506.106) (490.271) (497.645)
Loan/PP&E -5.487 -5.218 -5.320
(3.989) (4.008) (3.975)
Secured -56.753*** -56.803*** -56.941***
(16.758) (16.630) (16.710)
Log (Maturity) 9.867 2.128 5.018
(14.502) (14.495) (14.675)
Log (Total Covenants) -80.189*** -76.312*** -79.969***
(19.279) (18.690) (18.932)
Amend -6.321 -0.754 -1.832
(13.932) (13.887) (13.876)
Observations 930 930 930
R-squared 0.219 0.233 0.236
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
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Table 11: Changes in Investment after Loan Origination for the Propensity-Matched Sample
This table compares the change in investment after loan origination for packages with dynamic thresholds to
the changes for propensity-matched packages with constant thresholds. The dependent variable is ¢Capex(0,
t), which is computed as capital expenditures measured t quarters after loan origination minus capital
expenditures measured at the quarter of loan origination, where capital expenditures are scaled by the book
value of assets. Trend Dummy is equal to 1 if the loan package includes one or more covenants with dynamic
thresholds, and 0 otherwise. Capex Covenant equals 1 if the package includes a capital expenditure
covenant, and 0 otherwise. Firm characteristics are measured as of the quarter before loan origination.
Distance to Default is estimated using the KMV Merton model (Bharath and Shumway, 2008). Capex is
capital expenditures scaled by the book value of assets. Tobin's Q is the market value of assets scaled by the
replacement value of ¯rm assets. Book Assets is the book value of total assets in millions of USD. ROA is
income before extraordinary items, divided by the total assets. Leverage is the total amount of debt, divided
by the total assets. Loan/PP&E is the total amount of the loan granted under the package in millions scaled
by net property, plant, and equipment. Spread is the interest spread on the package in basis points. Maturity
is the maximum number of months before loan maturity granted under the package. Total Covenants is the
total number of covenants. Secured equals 1 if the loan is collateralized, and 0 otherwise. Amend equals 1 if
the package is an amended loan. The robust standard errors clustered by ¯rms are reported in parentheses.
¤ ¤ ¤p < 0:01; ¤ ¤ p < 0:05; ¤p < 0:1:
(1) (2)
¢Capex [0,+4] ¢Capex [0,+8]
Trend Dummy 0.257* 0.428***
(0.135) (0.158)
Capex Covenant 0.077 0.110
(0.102) (0.125)
Distance to Default -0.028 -0.045
(0.023) (0.028)






















Industry FE Yes Yes
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Table 12: Capex Covenant and Dynamic Thresholds in Financial Covenants for the
Propensity-Matched Sample
This table reports determinants of Capex covenants in a loan package using the FRM model with a logit link
function for the propensity-matched sample. The dependent variable in Column (1) is a dummy variable
that indicates whether a loan package includes a Capex covenant. The dependent variable in Columns (2)
and (3) is equal to 1 if a loan package includes a Capex covenant that allows ¯rms to increase capital
expenditures over time, and 0 otherwise. The sample used in Column (3) is restricted to those loan packages
that include Capex covenants. Trend Dummy is equal to 1 if the loan package includes at least one covenant
with dynamic thresholds, and 0 otherwise. Distance to Default is estimated using the KMV Merton model
(Bharath and Shumway, 2008). Capex is capital expenditures scaled by the book value of assets. Tobin's Q
is the market value of assets scaled by the replacement value of ¯rm assets. Book Assets is the book value of
total assets in millions of USD. ROA is income before extraordinary items, divided by the total assets.
Leverage is the total amount of debt, divided by the total assets. Loan/PP&E is the total amount of the
loan granted under the package in millions scaled by net property, plant, and equipment. Financial variables
are measured as of the quarter before loan origination. Spread is the interest spread on the package in basis
points. Maturity is the maximum number of months before loan maturity granted under the package. Total
Covenants is the total number of covenants. Secured equals 1 if the loan is collateralized, and 0 otherwise.
Amend equals 1 if the package is an amended loan. The robust standard errors clustered by ¯rms are
reported in parentheses. ¤ ¤ ¤p < 0:01; ¤ ¤ p < 0:05; ¤p < 0:1:
(1) (2) (3)
Capex Covenant Allowing Increasing Allowing Increasing
Capex Capex
Trend Dummy 0.336*** 0.453*** 0.339***
(0.077) (0.110) (0.131)
Distance to Default -0.078*** -0.049** 0.005
(0.013) (0.020) (0.021)
Capex -6.372*** -0.099 3.880
(2.268) (3.057) (3.625)
Tobin's Q -0.020 0.076 0.078
(0.057) (0.074) (0.081)
Log (Assets) -0.176*** -0.134*** -0.038
(0.031) (0.043) (0.051)
ROA -1.013 1.095 0.990
(1.222) (1.912) (2.298)
Leverage -0.459** 0.330 0.627*
(0.225) (0.285) (0.332)
Loan/PP&E -0.035*** -0.017* 0.000
(0.007) (0.010) (0.012)
Spread 0.176*** 0.222*** 0.199***
(0.034) (0.040) (0.051)
Log (Maturity) 0.038 0.190* 0.296**
(0.081) (0.108) (0.140)
Secured 0.578*** 0.814*** 0.461*
(0.126) (0.239) (0.263)
Log (Total Covenants) 2.486*** 1.482*** -0.027
(0.115) (0.177) (0.215)
Amend 0.133 0.175 0.155
(0.091) (0.134) (0.159)
Observations 5,446 5,446 1,840
Pseudo R-squared 0.346 0.250 0.162
Industry & Year-Qtr FE Yes Yes Yes
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Table 13: Covenant Restrictiveness at Loan Package Level for the Propensity-Matched Sample
This table shows the results of the association between the presence of dynamic covenant thresholds and
covenant restrictiveness for the propensity-matched sample. Strictness is overall covenant restrictiveness,
estimated at the loan package level using the model from Mur¯n (2012). ¢Strictness is the maximum of the
¯nal strictness minus the initial strictness scaled by loan maturity. Avg. Strictness is the average of the ¯nal
strictness and the initial strictness. Trend Dummy equals 1 if the loan package includes one or more
covenants with dynamic thresholds, and 0 otherwise. Distance to Default is estimated using the KMV
Merton model (Bharath and Shumway, 2008). Capex is capital expenditures scaled by the book value of
assets. Tobin's Q is the market value of assets scaled by the replacement value of ¯rm assets. Book Assets is
the book value of total assets in millions of USD. ROA is income before extraordinary items, divided by the
total assets. Leverage is the total amount of debt, divided by the total assets. Loan/PP&E is the total
amount of the loan granted under the package in millions scaled by net property, plant, and equipment.
Financial variables are measured as of the quarter before loan origination. Spread is the interest spread on
the package in basis points. Maturity is the maximum number of months before loan maturity granted under
the package. Total Covenants is the total number of covenants. Secured equals 1 if the loan is collateralized,
and 0 otherwise. Amend equals 1 if the package is an amended loan. The robust standard errors clustered by
¯rms are reported in parentheses. ¤ ¤ ¤p < 0:01; ¤ ¤ p < 0:05; p < 0:1:
(1) (2) (3)
Strictness ¢Strictness Avg. Strictness
Trend Dummy 8.205*** 0.678*** 10.407**
(0.963) (0.129) (1.479)
Distance to Default -0.774*** -0.080*** -2.174***
(0.163) (0.021) (0.248)
Capex -52.199 6.469* 65.303*
(33.202) (3.548) (37.879)
Tobin's Q -0.657 0.083 -2.977***
(0.612) (0.148) (0.945)
Log (Assets) -0.979** 0.125* -0.328
(0.445) (0.068) (0.555)
ROA -44.290* -11.088** -113.960***
(25.766) (4.509) (23.552)
Leverage 34.381*** 0.334 17.610***
(3.595) (0.501) (6.239)
Loan/PP&E -0.159 0.015 -0.021
(0.121) (0.013) (0.143)
Spread -1.304* 0.310*** 3.098***
(0.697) (0.110) (0.745)
Log (Maturity) 1.766* 0.500** -2.113
(1.024) (0.227) (1.785)
Secured -1.299 -2.187*** -1.855
(1.279) (0.318) (1.541)
Log (Total Covenants) 2.601** -0.337** 0.055
(1.163) (0.149) (1.672)
Amend 0.759 -0.322* 10.335***
(1.048) (0.196) (1.641)
Observations 1,804 1,804 1,804
R-squared 0.331 0.334 0.360
Industry & Year-Qtr FE Yes Yes Yes
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